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IN THE SUPRE~1E COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 






THE INDUSTRIAL COMMSSION OF ) 
UTAH, MARCUS PLUMBING & HEATING,) 
and THE ST . -~TE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAIN"TIFF 
No. 9931 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding for compensation and medical 
care under the Utah Workman's Compensation Act for 
injuries sustained by plaintiff by accident arising out of 
and in the course of plaintiff's employment by defendant, 
~:arcus Plwnbing & Heating. 
DISPOSITION B::FORE INDUSTRL~L CO:N!MISSION 
The case was heard before Commissioner Otto A. 
Wiesley, referee. Plaintiff seeks review of the order 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying plaintiff's 
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claim and of its order denying plaintiff's application 
for rehearin&. 
RELIEF~ OUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff ~ eeks to have said orders set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Acgust 22, 1962, plaintiff filed an application 
:~or hearing to settle industrial accident claim with 
defendant, Industrial Commission of Utah, hereafter 
referred to as the Commission, claiming that he was 
~njured Noven1ber 21, 1961, and that such injuries arose 
ont of or in the course of his employment by defendant 
Marcus Plumbing & Heating at Moab, Utah, and 
claiming that said injuries consisted of a hernia and 
back injuries which occured wh:le plaintiff was lifting 
pipe (R. 8). Plaintiff was given notice that no medical 
testimony would be allo~'ed at the hearing of said 
application (R. 10). The he a:- ing v;as held before 
Commissioner Otto A. Wiesley, referee, on January 
21, 1963 (R. 11, 30), and thereafter the Industrial 
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..:l 
Commi::>sion of Utah by order dated February 14, 1963, 
denied plaintiff's claim {R. 30). Plaintiff filed an 
application for Rehearing March 15, 1963, (R. 33), 
with the Commission, and the Commission denied the 
same by order dated May 8, 1963, (R. 34). Defendant, 
State Insurance Fund, was the Workman's Compensation 
insurance carrier for defenda.nt, Marcus Plum bing & 
Heating at the time of the alleged injuries (R. 9, 12). 
On or about November 21, 1961, plaintiff was lifting 
c. pipe, which turned out to be too heavy for him, over 
a pile of pipe of about 4 feet high (R. 13). The pipe was 
being llfied by hand because the hoist loacier could not 
reach it (R. 16). Plaintiff was on one end cf the pipe 
alone and two other persons were on the other end (R.l3). 
While doing so plaintiff testified that he received a 
"catch'' and had to let the pipe down and then lift it 
again, (R. 13). At that time, he stated "That is what 
makes dead babies'', and the lifting bothered him in 
the groin area and back (R. 13). The pipe '\J..ihich plaintiff 
lifted was, plaintiff testified, about 18 inches in diameter, . 
and about 18 feet long (R. 15). Steven L. Kay, the 
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foreman on the job, testified that it was 15 inch 
corrugated steel 20 feet long and weighed about 250 
pounds (R. 24), and he affirmed that the pipe was being 
set by hand. Plaintiff continued to work until the 
Thanksgivi~g holidays (R. 14). After the Thanksgiving 
holidays, plaintiff worked again for a few days (R. 14) 
I 
I 
and while straddling a smaller concrete pipe and lifting I 
and guiding it into place (R. 17), toward quiting time, 
the pipe slipped. Plaintiff stated to a companion, M ... 
Neff, that he didn't think he \vas hurt, however, the 
accident had torn the skin from his hands and brought 
blood to the ends of his fingers, (R. 14). After plaintiff 
got home, his right testicle (R. 19) had drawn up and 
~as up inside of him which was the first time plaintiff 
had had such t:-ouble before {R. 14). The next morning, 
he couldn't get out of bed and was confined to bed for 
several days before going to a doctor {R. 14) on about 
November 30, 1962 {R. 18). About four or five days 
elapsed bet\veen the two accidents (R. 16). Prior 
to the accidents, plaintiff had had a less than severe 
case of prostate trouble and also had hemorrhoids 
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Plaintiff told the doctor, Dr. Rutt, of Moab, (R. 18) 
that he was having trouble in the groin area (R. 19). 
Steven L. Kay, for em an on the job(R. 21) went to 
see plaintiff the next day (R. 22) when he didn't come to 
work to see what was the matter; this visit was on the 
day following plaintiff's last work on said job. At that 
visit, plaintiff told said foreman that he had hurt him-
self, his testicle had been giving him a problem as the 
result of having strained h~sel£, and that it was S\\·cllerr 
up, and that he was real stiff and sore and couldn't move 
around very well (R. 23), and that he had pain in the 
groin area (R. 24). The foreman told plaintiff to go see 
a doctor (R. 23). This was the only conversation the 
foreman had with plaintiff regarding plaintiff's injuries 
(R. 23). 
A co-worker, Edward L. Neff, (R. 25) on the same 
job (R. 26) testified that plaintiff told him that he had 
strained himself down in this testicles on the occasion 
when they were lifting and plac ing 20 :foot· lengths of 
corrugated pipe (R. 27). Neff was on the back hole 
digger (R. 2 7) and plaintiff was down in the tre~ch 
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lifting the pipe and Neff testified that the remark 
\\·as made after plaintiff had done some lifting (R .. 28). 
Plaintiff testified that the work he \1:as doing on 
November 21 was the sarr e type of work he was 
regularly doing (R. 28). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 . 
THE INDUSTRL~L COMMISSION ACTED ARBI-
TR:\RIL Y AND U1\RE..A SONAELY IN FINDING AND 
CONCLt.DD'JG TP~T PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WERE 
~OT THE RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT ARLSING OUT 
OF OR L~ TEE COURSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOY-
MENT. 
In order to establish his right. to compensation 
and n:)edical care pursuant to Section 35-1-45 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, plaintiff must establish that 
he was injured "by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment''. 
Plaintiff must thus show three things: (1) an 
accident arising out of or in the. course of his employ-
ment~ (2) an injury, and (3) that the accident caused 
the injury. 
Plaintiff is entitled to produce medical testimony 
to establish th& iR;jPTlf and,that the accident caused 
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the injury. In most cases such testimony is essential. 
Until plaintiff is given such an upportunity, such issues 
cannot be considered disposed of. Since medical 
testi.rr ony was not allowed at the hearing in this matter 
(R. lC'), the only issue which t~e Commission has 
considered is ~·hether there was an accident arising 
out of or in the course of plaintiff's employment. 
If the Commission was upon the evidence justified 
in finding that there was no such accident that would 
o~ course conclude the matter entirely. If not, then 
the decision of the Commission must be set aside 
and the matter returned to the Cor:-: :-:::s sian for 
consideration of the questions of causation and 
injury. 
The Commission was not justified in finding that 
no accident arose out of or in connection with plaintiff's 
employment. Since plaintiff '\\·as not given a hearing 
on the question of causation or injury, the definition 
of the kind of ''accident'' which plaintiff was required 
to prove is a very limited one, since its meaning does 
not involve the_ question of causation. All that the word 
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"accident'' can mean in this sense 1s an event or 
occurance, which may be an extrodinary exertion or 
which according to the case of Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commis.5ion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961, may 
be an ordinary exertion. In fact, it appears that plaintiff 
need not even establish an incident "identifiable at a 
definite time and place''. See Jones v. California 
Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244 P. 2d 640. If 
plaintiff has proved that an exertion took place which 
could have prod~..Lced a hernia, he has met the burden 
on this issue. Further, i£ the proof is such that 
reasonable minds could not but conclude that a hernia 
could result {not did result, as plaintiff has not had his 
day on this point) then plaintiff has established the 
point as a matter of law and the commission acted 
arbitrarily ar_d unreasonably in not so finding and 
concluding. Such is the proof in this case. 
In the case of Norris v. Industrial Commission, 
90 Utah 256, 61 P. 2d 413, this court set forth the test 
for determining '.vhen action of the Commission 
becomes a matter of law rather than one of fact. 
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It \\·as stated in tr at case at page 260: 
• • '\There the matter pres· nted on appeal 
is the ::uestion of whether the commission 
should ha\·e in ~aw arrived at a conclusion 
of fact different from that at which it did c.rrive 
from the evidence, a question of law is presented 
only ·\vhen it is claimed that the commission 
could only arrive at one conclusion from the 
evidence, and that it found contrary to that 
inevitable conclusion. But in order to 
reverse the commission in this· regard it 
mu.st appear at least that (a) the evi~ence is 
uncontradic: ed, and {b) there is nothing in 
the record which is intrinsically discrediting 
to t11.e uncontradicted testimony, and (c) that 
the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly that 
of interested witnesses or, if the uncontra-
d:.cted evidence is wholly or partly from others 
t~an interested witnesses, that the record shows 
nc ~ias or prejudice on the part of such other 
witnesses, anc (d) the uncontrac~rt.ed evidence 
is such as to carry a measure of conviction to 
the rec: so~1able mind and sustain the burden of 
proof~ and {e) precludes any other explanation 
or ~·-:.ypofl--esis as being more or equally as 
reaso~a'b=ly, and {f) there is nothing in the 
record v..:hich would indicate that the presence 
of the '\\·itnesses gave the commission such an 
advantc~e over the court in aid to its conclusions 
that the conclusions should for that reason not 
be disturbed.'' 
That test appears to have received general approval 
by this court as recently as 1954, in the case of 
Stroud v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270, 272 
F. 2d 187. Applying the Norris test in this case: 
(a) T~e ev1GE&E Li&&t=t.' uncontracicted. 
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Such is the case here. A fair analysis of the 
transcript clearly shows that neither Steven L. Kay 
nor Edward L. Neff, the only two witnesses at the 
hearing other than plairt iff, contradicted the testimony of 
plaintiff, that he was involv~d in an accident while lifting 
pipe on the job. There is no discrepancy of substance. 
(b) There must be nothing in the record which is 
intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony. 
Such is the cas-= ~~ere. It is by no means unusual 
or surprising for a person to receive a hernia and a 
back injury while lifting. The injury, by nature, is 
one which can't be seen by others except during an 
examination. The issue at the hearing before the 
Commission was not wl;..ether plain~~.:£ technically 
received a hernia o.r a back injury. In as much as 
plaintiff was not allowed to introduce medical testimony 
at the hearing, the only issue was whetherthe injury, 
if any, arose out of or in the course of plaintiff's 
employment. The only proof which can be presented 
on that question is that of the plaintiff and of his 
actions and comments as observed by others. Such 
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proof was made in thi::: case. Although the v.·itnesses 
\\·ere at times uncertain as to the e~act dates of the 
events, there Y.ere no disagreemE:nts of substance. 
A:1y uncertainty on the part of the witnesses is not 
surprising in the light of the lapse of time since the 
ace ide r1t, and is certainly not intrinsic ally discrediting. 
(c) The uncontradictec eviden~e must not be 
wholly that of interested witnesses and if from non-
interested witnesses the record must show no bias or 
prejudice on the part of such witnesses. 
This test is also n-:;et in this case. The testL-rnony 
of Steven L . .Kay anci Edward L. I~eii supports that 
of plaintiff. T~e e~:·idence does not disclose that they 
sa\\ the hernia or the back injury. They could not 
have seen it unless plaintiff had disrobed and that 
would certainly have been highly unusual under the 
circwnstances. They did, however, testify to the 
statements and the conduct of plaintiff and their 
testimony supports that of the plaintiff. Nor can it 
be sai2 that said ~~itnesses are interested or that 
the recorc shows that they '\\'ere in any way biased 
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or prejudiced. The recor~J does not indicate that 
they will be affected either favorably or negatively 
by any decision in this matter-?laint~££ didn't call them. 
Further, it appears that the requirement of the 
Norris decision, 5upra, that there by disinterested 
testimony has been considerably relaxed since the 
Norris decision. In the case of Dole v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 311, 204 P. 2d 462, a case 
decided about t'-velve years after the Norris case, 
this court annuled the order of the Commission 
denying compensation, although in that case the 
injury occured while the plaintiff was alone in a 
truck. Although plaintiff's was the only testimony 
of the occurance of the accident, the court held as a 
matter of la\v f:-.at the evidence established the 
necessary accident. In that case the court appeared 
willing tod i3pense with the requirement of disinterested 
testimony if the recor::l was sufficiently consistent. 
This rule seems to be ~ good or.~. and appears to be 
supported by the case of Peterson v. Industrial 
Commission, 83 Utah 94, 77 P. 2d 31, in which the 
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c·:,urt appea::-s to find the accident established as a 
m;,ttcr of la~' in large measure l:y the appearance 
and conduct of deceased. In the present case, the 
utter~nces and conduct of plaintiff taken together 
\\·ith his tes:ir.1ony est0.hlish a consistency which 
brings the case \\ ithin the decision in the Dole case, 
even if it did not meet the strict Norris test, which, 
howe\·er, it does. 
(d) The uncontradicted evidence is such as to 
c2rry a measure of conviction to the reasonable 
n-:ind and sustain the burden of proof. 
This requirement is met .. The testimony presents 
an entirely plausible and not unusual occurance. 
{e) The uncontradicted evidence precludes any 
other explanation or hypothesis as being more or 
equally as reosonable. 
This test is met. The record does not suggest 
cr e\·en hint at any explanation whatsoever for 
plaintiff's injuries other tl1an the lifting incidents 
v.:hich were brought out in the tesimony. It is thus 
not enough that some hypothesis might be advanced 
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in the realm oi conjecture. It would ha·./e to 3r:se 
naturally and reasonably from the evidence. There lS 
no such other hypothesis here. 
(f) There n1ust be no indication in the record 
that the presence of the witnesses gave the Commission 
such an advantage that its conclusions should not 
be disturbed for that reason. 
There is no such indication in the record. Further-
more, since the hearing was before only one of the 
commissioners as referee, the other two commissioners 
did not have any advantage in seeing or hearing the 
witnesses, and this test has much less meaning in 
this case than it might in others. There is certainly 
no indication of any special advantage. 
If plaintiff has established :~- 3.t an accident arose, t ~: 
i, I 
out of or in the cou:--se of his employment, as a matter 
of law, then due process requir es that he :--eceive a 
hearing on the question of causation and ir:.jury. 
Plaintiff is not required to give reasons to the 
Commission for a hearing on the question of causation 
and injury but only to petition for such, which plaintiff 
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has done. The petition for rehearing ad equate ly gives 
rl'asons for rehearing on the issue of ,,.hether an 
accident arose out of or in the course of plaintiff's 
• mployment. See Utah State Road Commission v. 
t•rlustrial Commission, 109 Utah 553, 168 P. 2d 319. 
One other point should be made. Although the 
only issue which has been fully heard by the Commission 
is that of the occurance of ?-<n accident, some of the 
testimony, as is only natural, tends· to show causation. 
In fact it \\·ould appear that this issue has been esta-
blished as a matter of law, for the reasons heretofore 
::d\·anced on the question of accident, except for the 
fact that defendants have not had opportunity to call 
expert \\'itnesses to present medical testimony on that 
issue if thev desire to do so 
. . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the findings and con-
elusions of the Industrial Commission constitute 
error as a matter of law and the said orders of the 
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Commis5ion :>hould be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert C. Cummings 
S~.one & Flanga.:; 
705 Utah Savings F·uilding 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attar neys for Plaintiff 
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